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Abstract 
The Foundational Model of Anatomy (FMA) symbolically re-
presents the structural organization of the human body from 
the macromolecular to the macroscopic levels, with the goal of 
providing a robust and consistent scheme for classifying ana-
tomical entities on the basis of explicit definitions. This scheme 
also provides a template for modeling pathology, physiological 
function and genotype-phenotype correlations, and it can thus 
serve as a reference ontology in biomedical informatics. Here 
we articulate the need for formally clarifying the is-a and part-
of relations in the FMA and similar ontology and terminology 
systems. We diagnose certain characteristic errors in the treat-
ment of these relations and show how these errors can be av-
oided through adoption of the formalism we describe. We then 
illustrate how a consistently applied formal treatment of taxo-
nomy and partonomy can support the alignment of ontologies. 
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Introduction 
The growth of bioinformatics has led to an increasing number 
of evolving ontologies which must be correlated with the exist-
ing terminology systems developed for clinical medicine. A 
critical requirement for such correlations is the alignment of 
the fundamental ontological relations used in such systems, 
above all the relations of class subsumption (is_a) and 
partonomic inclusion (part_of). To achieve this end, however, 
existing clinical and evolving bioinformatics terminologies 
need to call upon formalisms whose significance was not 
evident at the time these resources were originally conceived.  
Both is_a and part_of are ubiquitous in bioinformatics ontolo-
gies and terminologies. Yet their treatment is inconsistent and 
problematic, and in some cases the two relations are not clearly 
distinguished at all. SNOMED-RT, for example, has: both tes-
tes is_a testis. UMLS has: plant leaves is_a plant. 
In this communication we argue that a coherent treatment of 
is_a and part_of must be based on explicit formal definitions 
which take into account not only the classes involved as terms 
of these relations but also the instances of these classes. We 
base our arguments on the lessons we learned during the evolu-
tion of the Digital Anatomist Foundational Model of Anatomy 
(FMA, for short [1]) in which we have refined the treatment of 
these relations over time and distinguished between classes and 
instances in terms of canonical and instantiated anatomy. [2]   
Our objectives are to define canonical and instantiated ana-
tomy before giving formal definitions of is_a and part_of in 
terms of a theory of instantiation. We then discuss in this light 
issues of universal relevance to ontologies, such as classes vs. 
wholes and sets, granularity, idealization, and the role of time 
and change. After illustrating problematic usage of is_a and 
part_of we draw conclusions for ontology alignment, pointing 
to the need for supplementing Description Logic-based reason-
ing implementations with rigorous manual auditing of underly-
ing data-sources based on formal analyses in terms of instance-
level relations and on clear and intuitive principles of curation. 
Canonical and Instantiated Anatomy 
Canonical anatomy is a field of anatomy (science) that compri-
ses the synthesis of generalizations based on anatomical obser-
vations that describe idealized anatomy (structure). These gen-
eralizations have been implicitly sanctioned by their usage in 
anatomical discourse. Instantiated anatomy is a field of anato-
my (science) that comprises anatomical data pertaining to indi-
vidual instances of organisms and their parts. Instantiated ana-
tomy is needed to support the application of biomedical know-
ledge in clinical care and in fields such as image analysis. The 
corresponding instance-data is not incorporated into the FMA, 
which deals with idealizations at a higher level of abstraction. 
In introducing the relation between canonical and instantiated 
anatomy, however, the FMA provides the key to an adequate 
formal treatment of is_a and part_of, for the latter can be de-
fined and formally interrelated only when the relation of inst-
antiation between individuals and classes is taken into account.  
Formal Theory of Is_a and Part_of 
We use the term entity as a universal ontological term of art 
embracing objects, processes, functions, structures, times and 
places, and we distinguish among entities in general two 
special sub-totalities, called instances and classes, respectively. 
Instances are individuals (particulars, tokens) of special sorts. 
Thus each is a simply located entity, bound to a specific (nor-
mally topologically connected) location in space and time. [3] 
Classes (also called universals, kinds, types) are multiply 
located; they exist in their respective instances.  
To formalize these notions we use standard first-order logic 
with variables x, y, x1, etc. ranging over instances, and A, B, A1, 
etc. ranging over classes. Our system rests on two primitive re-
lations of inst and part.  
  1Inst is the relation of instantiation between an instance and a 
class, illustrated by: Jane is an instance of human being. We 
define a class as anything that is instantiated; an instance as 
anything (any individual) that instantiates some class. The 
principal axioms governing inst are: (1) that it holds in every 
case between an instance and a class, in that order; and (2) that 
nothing can be both an instance and a class. 
Part is the relation of parthood among individuals, illustrated 
by: Jane’s heart is part of Jane’s body. The axioms governing 
part (also called ‘proper part’) can be specified as follows [4]. 
It is (1) irreflexive (no entity is part of itself), (2) asymmetric 
(if part(x, y) then not-part(y, x)), and (3) transitive (if part(x, y) 
and part(y, z), then part(x, z)). In addition, it satisfies: (4) a  
principle governing the formation of sums of parts (for exam-
ple of binary sums x+y), and (5) a remainder axiom, to the ef-
fect that if part(x, y) then there is some part z of y which does 
not share parts in common with x.  
We use the standard quantifiers of first-order logic: ∃, abbrevi-
ating for some value of, and ∀, abbreviating for all values of. 
The device of quantification allows us to take account of inst-
antiation in generic fashion, i.e. without the need to take speci-
fic instances into account. The full formalism requires general 
axioms specifying the properties of classes as natural kinds (ra-
ther than arbitrary collections) [5], together with more specific 
axioms dealing with the different sorts of classes (of objects, 
functions, processes, pathways, sites, etc.) in the different do-
mains of biomedical ontology. It also requires an axiom of ex-
tensionality, to the effect that classes which share identical in-
stances are themselves identical. 
We can now define is_a, the relation of class subsumption: 
D1  A is_a B =def ∀x ( inst(x, A) → inst(x, B) )  
where ‘→’ abbreviates: if ... then .... To say that A is_a B is to 
say that every instance of A is an instance of B.  
To define part_of is more tricky. We start by defining: 
D2  A part_ for B =def 
   ∀x ( inst(x, A) →  ∃y ( inst(y, B) & part(x, y) ) ). 
D2 provides information primarily about As; it tells us that As 
do not exist except as instance-level parts of Bs. Conversely: 
D3  B has_ part A =def  
   ∀y ( inst(y, B) → ∃x ( inst(x, A) & part(x, y) ) ) 
provides information primarily about Bs; it tells us that Bs do 
not exist except with As as instance-level parts. 
Because there are female as well as male human beings, we 
can state: human testis part_for human being, but we cannot 
state: human being has_part human testis. Because non-hu-
man vertebrates also have hearts, we can state human being 
has_part heart, but not: heart part_for human being. 
We now define the relation part_of by combining D2 and D3: 
D4  A part_of B =def A part_for B & B has_part A  
Thus A part_of B if and only if: (i) for any instance x of A there 
is some instance y of B which is such that x stands to y in the 
instance-level part relation, and vice versa: (ii) for any instance 
y of B there is some instance x of A which is such that x stands 
to y in this same relation. This yields a strong structural mereo-
logical tie between the classes A and B (defining a so-called 
Egli-Milner order [6]). It guarantees that As exist only as parts 
of Bs and that Bs are structurally organized in such a way that 
As must appear in them as parts. That partonomies like those 
associated with the FMA are structured by the full part_of rela-
tion is ensured by the fact that here all terms for body parts are 
assumed to have an implicit prefix designating the type of 
organism involved.  
Sometimes we need to capture mereological relations involv-
ing specific numbers of instances. Thus in a case like human 
being has_ part brain, we need to express that each instance of 
human being has exactly one instance of brain as part:  
inst(x, human) →  ∃y∀z((inst(z, brain) & part(z, x)) ↔ z = y)  
with generalizations to represent a human being’s canonical 
organization as having two lungs, ten fingers, and so on. 
Both is_a and part_of are standardly treated as relations be-
tween classes. The formal structure of D4 makes it clear, how-
ever, that the latter does not signify that classes stand in some 
special class-level mereological inclusion relation. Rather, it 
expresses more fundamental part-relations – captured in D2 
and D3 – between the underlying instances.  
A distinction analogous to that between D2, D3 and D4 is in-
dispensable to the formal definition of many other foundational 
relations of biomedical ontologies – including 53 of the 54 
relations contained in the UMLS Semantic Network (UMLS-
SN, Version 2003AB) [7]. In particular, reference to instances 
is a necessary first step in the rigorous implementation, in sys-
tems like the FMA, of mereotopological relations such as 
spatial occupation and spatial adjacency, as also of concepts 
such as junction, boundary, cluster, and the like. [1,8,9]  
We can then prove that is_a is reflexive (for every class A we 
have: A is_a A), and antisymmetric (if A is_a B and B is_a A, 
then A and B are identical).  
We need to add as axiom that part_of  is irreflexive (that no 
class is part_of itself ). From this we can prove that part_of is 
also asymmetric (if A part_of B then not-B part_of A).  
We can prove also that both is_a and part_of are transitive: 
thus if A is_a B and B is_a C, then A is_a C, and if A part_of B 
and B part_of C then A part_of C. 
Classes vs. Wholes: Granularity and Idealization 
A rigorous system of formal definitions to support biomedical 
ontology alignment must clarify also the relations between the 
concept of class, mereological whole and set. Here, too, the 
reference to instances is indispensable. For classes are distin-
guished by the fact that they capture their instances in a way 
which involves the factor of granularity, which means: in such 
a way as to divide up the corresponding domain into whole 
units or members, whose interior parts and structure are traced 
over. [10] A mereological sum is not granular in this sense. 
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instance-level parts (including organs, cells, molecules, and so 
on). The class of human beings, in contrast, is instantiated only 
by human beings as single, whole units.  
The instances (units, members) in a class are marked out by the 
fact that, in the Aristotelian terms used by the FMA, they share 
a common essence. [11,12] Which classes exist in a given do-
main is a matter for empirical research. Hence a good first clue 
to the existence of a class is provided by the fact that there 
exists a corresponding term that has either been sanctioned by 
(in our case anatomical) science or can be inferred from terms 
so sanctioned by the need to fill gaps in the taxonomy or par-
tonomy (for example terms for higher-level classes and for not 
previously named classes instantiated by macroscopic parts of 
the body) [13]. In anatomy and related disciplines a supple-
mentary clue may be provided through the association of given 
classes with the structural genes whose coordinated expression 
gives rise to the corresponding instances. 
Each class-definition in the FMA specifies the essence shared 
by the corresponding instances via the specification of (i) a 
genus, which is some wider class to which the given class be-
longs, together with (ii) the differentiae which mark out its in-
stances within this wider class.  
Biological classes are marked always by an opposition between 
standard or prototypical instances and a surrounding penumbra 
of non-standard instances (not all instances of the class human 
being are marked by the presence of amputation stumps or pi-
tuitary tumors). To do justice to these matters FMA introduces 
the factor of idealization, which means (in first approximation) 
that the classes of the FMA’s Anatomy Taxonomy AT include 
only those instances to which canonical anatomy applies. 
This means that we need to revise definitions D1–D4 by res-
tricting the range of variables x, y, ... to the realm of indivi-
duals which satisfy the generalizations of canonical anatomy, 
so that the same abstraction of anatomy (structure) will be re-
presented in all the instances of any given AT-class. This de-
vice of specifying different ranges of variables gives us the 
means also to represent the generalizations belonging to the 
different branches of canonical anatomy, for example to cano-
nical anatomy for male vs. female human beings, for human 
beings at various developmental stages, and for organisms in 
other species. It can allow us also to represent the generaliza-
tions governing the anatomical variants yielded by the pre-
sence of, for example, coronary arteries or bronchopulmonary 
segments, which deviate from canonical anatomical patterns of 
organization.  
Classes vs. Sets: Granularity and Time 
Sets in the mathematical sense, too, are marked by the factor of 
granularity, which means that each set comprehends its 
members as single, whole units. A class or set is laid across re-
ality like a grid consisting (1) of a number of slots or pigeon-
holes each (2) occupied by some member. (This informal talk 
of grids and slots is formalized in [14] in terms of the theory of 
granular partitions.) Classes are distinguished from sets, how-
ever, by the fact that a set is determined by its members. This 
means that it is (1) associated with a specific number of slots, 
each of which (2) must be occupied by some specific member. 
A set is thus specified in a double sense. A class, in contrast, 
survives the turnover in its instances, and so it is specified in 
neither of these senses, since both (1) the number of associated 
slots and (2) the individuals occupying these slots may vary 
with time. 
Sets are distinguished from classes also in this: a set with n 
members has in every case exactly 2
n subsets, constituted by all 
the combinations of these members. The subclasses of a class, 
on the other hand, are limited in number, and which classes are 
subsumed by a larger class is a matter for empirical science to 
determine. Leaves (lowest nodes) in the taxonomy are (chang-
ing) collections of instances. As we move up the taxonomy we 
encounter in succession collections of such collections of in-
stances, collections of collections of such collections, etc., org-
anized in a nested hierarchy reaching up to the maximal class 
or ‘root’. We can visualize the classes at different levels as be-
ing analogous to geopolitical entities (towns, counties, states) 
as represented on a map. Instances correspond in this analogy 
to the corresponding populations: a class is not determined by 
its instances as a state is not determined by its citizens. 
Classes are distinguished from sets also by their relation to 
time. A set is an abstract structure, existing outside time and 
space, and this is so even when its members are parts of con-
crete reality. Since each set is determined by its members, the 
set of human beings existing at t is (timelessly) a different 
entity from the set of human beings existing at t′  because of 
births and deaths.  
Matters are different with regard to classes. The class human 
being can survive the change in the stock of its instances which 
occurs when John and Jane die, because classes exist in time. 
John and Jane themselves can similarly survive changes in the 
stock of cells or molecules by which they are constituted. 
To do justice to the fact that classes in the biological domain 
endure even when their extensions change, a full definition of 
the is_a relation must involve a temporally indexed reading of 
inst (with variables t, t′, etc., ranging over times): 
D1*  A is_a B =def ∀t ∀x ( inst(x, A, t) → inst(x, B, t) ), 
so that A is_a B means: at all times t, if x is an instance of A at t 
then x is an instance of B at t. D1* will also take care of false 
positives such as adult is_a child, which an untensed reading 
of D1 would otherwise allow. In general, all statements of inst 
and part relations involving objects in biomedical ontologies, 
like all the data of instantiated anatomy, are indexed by times. 
Taxonomy and Partonomy 
A taxonomy such as AT is formally speaking a tree in the 
mathematical sense. It satisfies axioms to the effect that (1) it 
has a root or unique maximal genus (here: anatomical entity) 
and (2) all other classes are connected to this root via finite 
chains of is_a relations satisfying a principle of single inheri-
tance. A partonomy, in contrast, is a partial order in the mathe-
matical sense, with top (here: organism – the class instantiated 
by mereologically maximal entities), to which all other classes 
  3are connected via chains of part_of relations.  
We can then define the concepts of root and leaf of a taxonomy 
and top and bottom of a partonomy as follows. 
D5  root(A) =def ∀B (B is_a A)  
D6  leaf(A) =def ∀B (B is_a A → A = B) 
D7  top(A) =def  
     ∀B (A = B or B part_of A) & not-∃B (A part_of B) 
D8  bottom(A) =def not-∃B (B part_of A). 
We can then postulate axioms to the effect that every class 
includes some leaf as subclass, and that every instance of every 
class instantiates some leaf: 
   ∀A∃B ( leaf(B) & B is_a A )  
   ∀A∀x ( inst(x, A) → ∃B (leaf(B) & inst(x, B) ) )  
The taxonomical union A∪B of classes A and B is defined as 
the minimal class satisfying the condition that it contains both 
A and B as subclasses. Such a class always exists, since A and 
B are in any case subclasses of the root. The taxonomic union 
of  femur  and  liver, for example, is organ. The partonomic 
union of two classes A+B is the class, if it exists, whose in-
stances are sums x+y of instances of classes A and B respec-
tively. While every pair of classes has a taxonomic union, only 
some classes have a partonomic union, since entities of the 
form x+y are instances of classes only in some highly restricted 
cases, for example: left lung = upper-lobe-of-left-lung + 
lower-lobe-of-left-lung.  Such examples characteristically in-
volve the phenomenon of fiat boundaries. [15,16] 
As concerns taxonomic intersection, a class is never immedi-
ately subordinated to more than one higher class within a tree. 
This means that if two classes overlap in sharing some 
common sub-class, then this is because one is a subclass of the 
other. A∩B, the taxonomic intersection of A and B, if it exists, 
is then simply the smaller of these two classes. We can add 
further an axiom to the effect that, if two classes are such as to 
overlap in sharing some common instances, then this, too, is 
because one is a subclass of the other: 
∃x (inst(x, A) ∧ inst(x, B)) → A is_a B or B is_a A. 
Classes can overlap partonomically, on the other hand, in such 
a way that there is a class which stands in the part_of relation 
to both, though neither stands in this relation to the other: 
D9  A1 partonomic_overlap A2 = def  
     ∃ A (A part_of A1 & A part_of A2). 
For example: pelvis  and  vertebral column overlap in the 
sacrum and coccyx. Most classes in the biomedical domain do 
not overlap partonomically in this sense, yet it is this difference 
in behavior between taxonomic and partonomic overlap which 
captures the essential difference between the tree structure of 
taxonomies and the partial order structure of partonomies.  
Problematic Representations of Is_a and Part_of 
To see what such clarifications are good for, we consider the 
example of the Gene Ontology™ (GO) [17]. GO, too, is cen-
tered around two foundational relations ‘is a’ and ‘part of’. 
The former it uses consistently and in a way which is in accord 
with our definition D1 above, though GO’s literature some-
times designates it, incorrectly, as ‘is an instance of’. [18] The 
relation ‘part of ’, in contrast, is used by GO in at least three 
ways. First, in assertions like ‘Cell Component part of Gene 
Ontology’, to represent inclusion relations between vocabula-
ries. Second, to represent a time-dependent mereological rela-
tion between classes that is specified only informally: 
“part of means can be a part of, not is always a part of: the 
parent need not always encompass the child. For example, in 
the component ontology, replication fork is a part of the 
nucleoplasm; however, it is only a part of the nucleoplasm 
at particular times during the cell cycle” [18]. 
Third, in examples such as flagellum part of cell, to stand for a 
variant of our part_for defined in D2 above.  
GO’s first usage represents a simple inclusion relation between 
lists. Its second usage would seem to correspond formally to: 
D10  A sometimes_part_ofGO B  =def  ∃t ∃x ∃y  
         ( inst(x, A, t) & inst(y, B, t) & part(x, y, t) ). 
A is part of B, on this reading, if there is some time at which an 
instance of A stands in the part relation to an instance of B. 
It’s third usage suggests a definition along the lines of: 
D11     A part_ofGO B =def ∃C (C is_a B & A part_of C), 
according to which A is part of B means: there is some subclass 
C of B for which A part_of C. 
Against this background GO’s Usage Guide [18] lists four 
‘logical relationships’ between its ‘is a’ and ‘part of’ relations, 
which can be summarized in our terms as follows: 
(1)   (A part_ofGO B & C is_a B) → A part_ofGO C 
(2)    is_a is transitive 
(3)    part_ofGO is transitive   
(4) (A is_a B & C part_ofGO A) → C part_ofGO B. 
(1)–(3) are accepted by GO; (4), on the other hand, is rejected. 
Yet there are many cases for which (1) fails. For example: 
   hydrogenosome  part_ofGO  cytoplasm 
    sarcoplasm is_a cytoplasm 
But not:  hydrogenosome part_ofGO  sarcoplasm. 
GO’s curators accordingly now consider removing the corres-
ponding assertion from its Usage Guide.  
As concerns (3), consider: 
 plastid  part_ofGO cytoplasm 
 cytoplasm  part_ofGO cell (sensu Animalia) 
But not: plastid part_ofGO cell (sensu Animalia). 
While ‘cell (sensu Animalia)’ is not a term in GO, it does con-
form to GO’s rules for term formation, and this suggests reason 
for some uncertainty also as to the validity of (3). 
GO justifies its rejection of (4) with the following example: 
meiotic chromosome is_a chromosome    
    synaptonemal complex part_ofGO meiotic chromosome  
  4But not necessarily:                                                                                                          
  synaptonemal complex part_ofGO chromosome.  
On the reading of GO’s ‘part of’ as meaning ‘can be part of’, 
however, it seems that synaptonemal complex is ‘part of’ 
chromosome. And if the reading of GO’s ‘part of ’ given in 
D11 is correct, then (4) can indeed be proved as a matter of 
logic. 
We suggest that it is only by appeal to formal definitions that 
these and related uncertainties (detailed in [19]) can be re-
solved. Formal definitions would help to ensure also that when 
the terms of controlled vocabularies like GO are mapped into 
the UMLS Metathesaurus then this is done in ways that sup-
port the drawing of reliable inferences concerning relations 
between these terms and existing terms in the Metathesaurus. 
Conclusion 
Practitioners in the biomedical sciences move easily between 
the realm of classes and the realm of instances existing in time 
and space. For historical reasons, however, work on 
biomedical ontologies and terminologies – which grew out of 
work on medical dictionaries and nomenclatures – has focused 
almost exclusively on classes (or ‘concepts’) atemporally 
conceived. This class-orientation is common in knowledge 
representation, and its predominance has led to the en-
trenchment of an assumption according to which all that need 
be said about classes can be said without appeal to formal 
features of instantiation of the sorts described above. This, 
however, has fostered an impoverished regime of definitions in 
which the use of identical terms in different systems has been 
allowed to mask underlying incompatibilities. Matters have not 
been helped by the fact that description logic, the prevalent 
framework for terminology-based reasoning systems, has with 
some recent exceptions (e.g. [20]) been oriented primarily 
around reasoning with classes. 
Certainly if we are to produce information systems with the re-
quisite computational properties, then this entails recourse to a 
logical framework like that of description logic. At the same 
time, however, we must ensure that the data that serves as 
input to such systems is organized formally in a way that sus-
tains rather than hinders successful alignment with other 
systems. The way forward is to recognize, as does the FMA, 
that these are two distinct tasks, both of which are equally 
important to the construction of biomedical ontologies and 
terminologies. 
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